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Abstract
Intelligence analysis is critical national security and law enforcement function dependant on the intellectual capacity of
individual analysts. The practice of intelligence is undertaken in an extremely complex environment often under a veil
of secrecy, and where uncertain and deceptive information represents the norm. In order to develop as a profession
appropriate constructs with which to explore and explain how analysts process intelligence, make decisions and reach
judgements are needed. An improved understanding will offer opportunities to develop appropriate training and
professional development for intelligence analysts. This paper introduces the construct of Professional Intelligence
Judgement Artistry together with some very early findings to emerge from an initial series of interviews undertaken as
part of a pilot study.
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INTRODUCTION
In the post 9/11 environment a rich body of knowledge has emerged as scholars from within and external to the
intelligence profession have sought to define what intelligence is and what it is that intelligence analysts do (Cooper,
2005; George, 2004; Johnston, 2005; Lefebvre, 2004; Marrin, 2009; Marrin & Clemente, 2005; Russell, 2004). That
body of literature has further grown as the intelligence community sought to understand why intelligence fails, what
constitutes good analysis, the relationship between analysts, agencies and decision-makers and what represents
analytical best practice (Cooper, 2005; Moore, Kirzan, & Moore, 2005; Swenson, 2003). Intelligence analysis is very
much a human practice very much dependant on the intellectual capacity of individual analysts. Moreover the practice
of intelligence is undertaken in an extremely complex environment often under a veil of secrecy, and where uncertain
and deceptive information represents the norm. In order to develop as a profession appropriate constructs with which to
explore and explain how analysts process intelligence, make decisions and reach judgements are needed. An improved
understanding will offer opportunities to develop appropriate training and professional development for intelligence
analysts. This paper introduces the construct of Professional Intelligence Judgement Artistry together with some very
early findings to emerge from an initial series of interviews undertaken as part of a pilot study.
Background & Significance
The use of intelligence is not limited to national security and defence domains. Intelligence plays a significant factor in
the compliance and enforcement roles of governments (Gill & Phythian, 2006). Intelligence is recognised as a key
function of modern law enforcement as it enhances law enforcement effort. The perceived value of intelligence in law
enforcement is demonstrated in the common use of the term ‘intelligence led policing’ in various parts of the world
(Cope, 2004; Grieve, 2004, p. 25; Ratcliffe, 2004, p. 5).
Whilst the popular media characterizes intelligence as consisting of such things as spies and secret collection
technology, the critical element of successful intelligence production is, and remains the intelligence analyst. This
proposition is demonstrated by the fact that it is the analyst who initiates collection of information, and who processes,
integrates and interprets that information. It is argued that it is the analyst who creates and disseminates intelligence
products, generates context and provides insights all necessary for optimal decision making (Cooper, 2005; Lefebvre,
2004; Rieber, 2004). To date there has been very little research into the role of the law enforcement analyst. This
research therefore will contribute to the body of knowledge by providing understanding of what constitutes the
difference between average and outstanding law enforcement intelligence analysts.
Professional Artistry
Schon (1992) first introduced the concept of professional artistry as a construct that could explain the higher level
competence of skilled professionals working in the murky complexity of real world problems where theory did not
always provide the appropriate answer. Subsequently scholars across a range of disciplines have adapted and utilised
the concept of professional artistry to formulate constructs in which to examine higher level competence in real world
professional scenarios across a range of disciplines including education, health and management (Grainger, 2003;
Paterson, 2003; Sadler-Smith & Smith, 2006). Paterson(2003) posited the construct Professional Practice Judgment
Artistry as means of explaining the complexity of judgement and practice as it pertains to the domain of occupational
therapy. Professional intelligence analysts are required to make complex judgments at the micro, macro and metalevels that optimise decision making on the part of the client for particular circumstances and within a specific context
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in a similar way to Paterson’s occupational therapists. Analogous to Paterson’s model, intelligence analysts process
complex problems including moral and ethical issues, which may question values, beliefs and assumptions; the
outcomes of which may impact on a specific individual through to national security scenarios that impact the entire
community. On that basis it does appear that the concept of professional artistry provides an appropriate foundation for
the construct Professional Intelligence Judgement Artistry.

THE STUDY
The purpose of this research is to examine the processes of intelligence analysis using a construct of Professional
Intelligence Judgement Artistry (PIJA). How is PIJA demonstrated? What frameworks do analysts use to make
decisions? What forces internal and external might contribute to or influence the analytical process? For the purpose of
this study intelligence analysis has been limited to the domain of law enforcement intelligence in order to create a
coherent context for the examination of analytical decision-making. However law enforcement has not been limited to
policing but includes those government agencies that have compliance and regulatory functions and maintain an
intelligence capability.
This study is utilising a qualitative research paradigm to both define and refine the construct PIJA. This approach
allows the research to be conducted in the real world, examining the construct of PIJA in its full context (Bowen, 2005;
Ehigie & Ehigie, 2005; Krauss, 2005). In the case of the PIJA construct, it is argued that its complexity necessitates the
extraction of meaning for the purpose of understanding rather than proving. Moreover this research fits the
‘naturalistic’ ontology as described by Bowen (2005) in that it is being conducted in the natural setting, utilising
qualitative methods, purposive sampling and inductive analysis. This approach is considered appropriate in the case of
this research as it is exploratory research into the phenomenon of intelligence analysis.
There are significant differences between domains examined in previous research, Occupational Therapists are tertiary
trained and recognised as professionals whom it may be argued have a common foundation in terms of understanding
professional outcomes within their field. Furthermore they are regulated by governing bodies, require certification and
represented by professional bodies as is the case across the wider medical domain and with education. A similar case it
may be argued exists in the management domain (Grainger, 2003; Paterson, 2003; Sadler-Smith & Smith, 2006).
Intelligence analysts however do not have to undertake formal education to prepare them for employment, there is
significant variation in the employment of intelligence analysts and whilst there is some common foundation in terms of
professional capability or understanding, there are quite significant variations across the profession. Evetts (2006)
posits a view as to how to recognise or define professions suggesting that they may be categorised by virtue of the fact
that they operate in the knowledge environment, focus on the uncertainties in risk societies and are ostensibly dealing
with risk and risk assessment to support a client’s management of uncertainty. Intelligence is and has historically been
focused on determining risk exposure and reducing uncertainty. Rodgers (2006) and Marrin and Clemente (2005) in
seeking to address the issue of intelligence as a profession argue that there are striking similarities between the
profession of intelligence and that of medical and mental health practitioners in terms of the approach to diagnosis and
analytical prediction. Therefore for the purpose of this study intelligence will be deemed a profession.
A pilot study comprising three interviews was conducted during September / October 2009. The three participants were
selected for their breadth of experience across multiple law enforcement agencies. The analysts referred to hereafter as
W1 through W3 are described below:





W1 has been working as an analyst for six years primarily in the policing environment. W1 has an
undergraduate degree in computer science and has completed a course work Masters of Information Security
and Intelligence.
W2 has been employed as an analyst for eight years now and has worked in policing, anti-corruption, the
private sector and a compliance role in state government. W2 has completed an undergraduate degree in
criminology. In addition to operational analytical roles W2 also has experience in the delivery of intelligence
training within the law enforcement domain.
W3 has been employed as an analyst for nineteen years and during this time has worked in state and federal
agencies primarily within the law enforcement domain. W3 has completed a Graduate Diploma in Criminal
Intelligence. In addition to the operational roles held by W3 he has been involved in the delivery of
intelligence training within the law enforcement domain.

The interview process consisted of semi-structured interviews, each lasting approximately 50 minutes and addressed
nine themes as shown in the table below. Each theme was explored in conversation with the subject and issues of
interest teased out through a series of sub questions appropriate to the theme being explored at the time. All interviews
were subsequently transcribed by the researcher. Initial analysis has consisted of identifying key concepts to emerge
from the interviews.
Background, experience & history
of the analyst

The concept of analysis

Decision & judgement in analysis
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Art, science, craft of analysis

Expertise and analysis

The
analyst,
outstanding

Professional artistry

Ethics & analysis

General thoughts

average

and

DISCUSSION OF EARLY FINDINGS
Due to the very early stage of this research the discussion of responses to the themes will be limited primarily to some
interesting insights pertinent to the context of professional artistry. In the first instance though it is worth looking
briefly at what might be described as the serendipitous entry into the world of intelligence as all three analysts were
very quick to highlight their accidental entry into the profession. Moreover all three analysts when describing their
career actually focus on the serendipitous nature of their entry into the profession. Notwithstanding this accidental
career choice all discuss their profession with an obvious passion. The statement by W1 below clearly demonstrates
this aspect of accidental entry into the profession.
“Well I fell into it by accident, to be honest, [ ] I didn’t even know such a job existed when I was going through
high school, Uni as a career path.”
This accidental nature of entry into the profession has come as something of a surprise however its significance at this
early stage is not certain. Its relevance may be more specific to the concept of intelligence as a profession rather than
professional artistry, it is however an issue that will be explored further as the study progresses.
Experts, expertise and analysis
The concepts of the intelligence experts and analytical expertise were discussed with each participant. W1 suggested
that the domain of intelligence was one in which experts cannot really exist whereas W3 was of the opinion that
expertise was something quite narrow and contained within a specific context. Overall there was reluctance to use the
label expert in regards specific intelligence analysts. Whereas on the issue of intelligence analysis both W2 and W3
focused on what they perceived to be an incongruity in that you analyse information in order to produce intelligence.
However all three agreed that intelligence analysis was also about creating context out of voluminous data. Generally
the participants’ description of analysis as a process was consistent with the literature. Lefebvre (2004) describes the
process of intelligence analysis as being one of evaluation and transformation of data into a product for the use of policy
consumers who may more broadly be defined as being decision makers. Critically it involves “assessing the reliability
and credibility of the data, and comparing it with the knowledge base available to the analyst, to separate fact from error
and uncover deception” (Lefebvre, 2004, p. 236). Gill and Phythian (2006) suggest that analysis is a process of seeking
knowledge and assigning certainty sufficient to allow decision makers to act on the intelligence provided. More
generally analysis is recognised as being an intellectual process focused on identifying truths, making appropriate
judgements and explaining the evidentiary basis of such (Atran, 2006; George, 2004; Herbert, 2006; Heuer, 1999;
Moore, 2007; Moore et al., 2005). It was therefore expected that the study participants would also describe their own
profession within a similar context and this proved to be the case. However a somewhat unexpected finding was the
degree of superficiality of understanding of those various concepts as they relate to the profession of intelligence. It is
possible that this reflects the fact that there is no core professional knowledge base for the profession and is a key point
of difference with professions such as medicine, occupational therapy and education.
Self as an analyst
According to Schon one of the keys to higher level competence or excellence is the ability to reflect on one’s own
knowledge and experience (1992). It was therefore expected to some degree even in these exploratory interviews that
participants would have in the course of their career reflected on what they know and what they do however responses
seemed to suggest this had not really occurred. When queried, on their decision-making and judgement processes all
three analysts struggled to find words to describe how they made decisions or formed judgements. Whilst all could
describe a process when it came to framing their actual decision making and judgement they introduced terms such as
experience and intuition. W1 and W2 described it as just something they have come to know and to some degree
something they had not really given much thought to previously. Whereas W3 struggled to articulate it as clearly as he
wanted yet at the same time did clearly demonstrate evidence of significant reflection on the issue. The Analysts were
asked to describe or explain how concepts such as art, science and craft related to intelligence and in particular how it
related to themselves as analysts. W1 struggled with this and tended to consider art and science in very concrete terms.
This may be representative of his lack of experience or possibly a reflection of his employment in the tactical domain of
intelligence. Having considered the issue of intelligence as an art, science or craft W2 when seeking to describe it was
inclined to put it into the context of what made an outstanding analyst outstanding, W2 linked artistry to experience.
Whereas W3 had some specific views as to how this related to the development of analysts and a strong view that you
can’t make an analyst unless they have certain basic aptitudes. Generally concepts of art and science as it related to
analysis were understood at a relatively superficial level. However in the case of W3 there were some fairly clear
distinctions as to where art and science fit in the analysis framework. In W3s case science was something that dealt
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with technology applications to intelligence whereas art represented the human aspect on analysis. W3 suggested a link
between art and aptitude and suggested that it was the art aspect that was necessary for higher level analysis. This is in
keeping with the observations of Paterson in relation to excellence in Occupational Therapy(2003).
Separating average from outstanding
When asked to describe an outstanding analyst W2 and W3 both were able to quite clearly articulate many of the
aspects that separated the outstanding analyst from the average whereas W1 struggled somewhat. W1 in fact seemed to
have a more superficial understanding of what the differences may have been. That said W1 recognises that there is
element of going beyond the requirement possibly anticipating intent of the intelligence client. With regard the concept
of the average analyst all three were quite clear in their opinions that the average analyst is one whom has technical
proficiency, capacity to complete the task within specified parameters, utilised a pro-forma or template approach to
completion of the task at hand. This compared with the outstanding analyst, whom demonstrated insight, perception,
curiosity and passion for the task. This is in keeping with Schon (1992, p. 51) who introduces what he refers to as
‘indeterminate zones of practice – the situations of complexity, the elusive task of problem setting’ and the role of
artistry in dealing with this. This professional artistry reflects the tacit experiential knowledge practitioners acquire.
Knowledge they just know yet struggle to articulate. Paterson, Wilcox and Higgs (2006) build on the work of Schon
and introduce the concept of “judgement artistry” as a means of explaining how individual practitioners integrate the
breadth of their experience and knowledge, within the context of their environment to deal with highly complex
problems. Grainger (2001) also builds on Schon’s work and expands the meaning of artistry to encompass how
professionals translate knowledge and theories irrespective of the domain from which they are drawn. In all cases the
argument is that there is more to professional competence or expertise than learned technical competency. Based on the
outcomes of these early interviews it does appear that the constructs of professional artistry and judgement artistry may
prove to be an appropriate framework in which to assess the process of intelligence analysis.

CONCLUSION
At this very early stage in the study with limited analysis of the interview data substantive conclusions as to what
separates the average from the outstanding intelligence analyst cannot be stated. However even at this early stage there
is evidence emerging that the means of identifying and understanding what separates the two states is the lens of
professional artistry. Some scholars and the study participants tend to be in agreement that good analysts posses certain
qualities regardless of the domain they operate in (Gazit, 1980; Heuer, 1999). Those qualities include demonstrated
intellectual capacity, curiosity, a degree of scepticism, and attention to detail. Additional qualities noted by the study
participants include, creativity, tenacity, foresight and contextual understanding. These qualities are in keeping with
those identified by Paterson (2003) in her study of occupational therapists and by Grainger (2003) in her study of
professional artistry in teaching.
What has emerged from these interviews is a sense that intelligence analysis is at once complex and an intellectually
demanding task. In order to operate effectively analysts need strategies to be able to cope with voluminous amounts of
disparate data and ability to contextualise the problems they face. Unlike the investigators whom, in essence deal with
facts the analysts deal with speculation, supposition, facts and a high level of uncertainty. Outstanding analysts in many
cases identify the problem before the problem is recognised as such whereas average analysts are more process driven.
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